| Abstract |
The cybersecurity of the power grid has gained increasing attraction in today's smart grid system. The dynamic load-altering attack (DLAA), which causes under-frequency trips by injecting an attacking load, and the false data injection (FDI), which involves intercepting communications and injecting malware, are the two most popular threats. The traditional DLAA is impractical due to the unrealistic level of attack load needed. The FDI is even more difficult since it requires hijacking power grid communication or sensors maintained by professional cybersecurity specialists. However, the rise of high-power distributed energy resources (DERs) has renewed the viability of DLAA. In this paper, a novel efficient hybrid DLAA-FDI attack is investigated as a practical security threat compared to the traditional DLAA or FDI attacks. Specifically, the attacker only needs to interrupt the communication instead of malware injection. The required attack load for DLAA is reduced because the communication is being interrupted. Moreover, both numerical analysis and rigorous proof are provided to show the impact of the novel hybrid DLAA-FDI attack. |
, D.-W. Duan 
